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This article describes the neoliberal experiment of the 1990s
in Peru,  placing it in its historical  context. The central  hy-
pothesis is that in that decade the Peruvian economy has
lacked an operational system of monetary and fiscal policies
capable of functioning without giving rise to serious distur-
bances in the level of economic activity. The monetary
authorities do not possess the basic instruments which have
been used in the past to handle adverse external shocks affect-
ing the Peruvian economy, because of two structural reforms
carried out in the financial field: the dollarization of the bank-
ing system and the opening-up of the capital account. The
article consists of seven sections. It begins with a brief introduc-
tion (section I). It then describes the neoliberal experiment of the
1990s, placing it in its immediate historical context (section II);
analyses the role which has been played by the growth strategy,
the international economic situation and macroeconomic policy
in the long-term performance of the Peruvian economy (section
III); describes the way in which adverse external shocks were
handled in the period from 1950 to 1975 (section IV); examines
the evolution of macroeconomic policy in the 1990s, analysing its
limitations (section V); illustrates these limitations in the light of
recent macroeconomic experience (section VI), and ends with
some conclusions (section VII).







The expansion of the Peruvian economy during the
1950s and part of the 1960s, on the basis of an almost
pure primary-export growth strategy and a State ide-
ology based on the Manchester School, was an anachro-
nism compared with the Southern Cone countries of
Latin America, which favoured import substitution and
the original economic thinking of ECLAC.
It was only in the 1970s that the country em-
barked on a real import substitution strategy, once
again in the most uncompromising version of the en-
tire continent. Naturally, it only began to export
manufactures at quite a late date, at the end of the
decade. With the external debt crisis, the whole story
went into suspended animation, and then came hyper-
inflation.
The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, carried out
by the Fujimori administration, seek to put the clock
back to the 1950s in economic terms, returning to the
primary-export model. The control of hyperinflation
and the defeat of Sendero Luminoso are the main
positive elements in this venture. Some also suggest
that a third and by no means negligible positive fea-
ture is the authoritarian nature of the political regime.
There are also two negative elements in this ven-
ture. One is the tendency to adopt extreme ap-
proaches, which is almost a tradition in Peru. The
history of the last few years is marked by too many
radical economic experiments, too many irreversible
structural reforms. Its radicalism may be one of the
negative features of this neoliberal reform process of
the 1990s, among other reasons because it impedes ad-
aptation to outside circumstances, which are always
changing for an economy like that of Peru, and gener-
ally speaking the outside situation in the first half of the
present decade was excessively favourable.
The second important negative aspect of the neo-
liberal reforms is connected with macroeconomic
policy. In the past, the Peruvian economy has rarely
qualified as a candidate for the select club of  the
best-run economies of Latin America, as Chile did
after 1983 or as Colombia has also done, but on the
other hand it did not display permanent or structural
defects in its macroeconomic policy system, that is to
say, in its fiscal and monetary policy system.
Today, however, the situation is different. As we
shall see below, the present macroeconomic policy
system suffers from severe limitations due to the fi-
nancial liberalization process of the 1990s: i.e., the
dollarization of the banking system and the opening
of the capital account.
II
The significance of the structural
reforms of the 1990s
The structural reforms applied by the Fujimori gov-
ernment have reintroduced a primary-export growth
strategy similar to that which has prevailed in the
Peruvian economy during most of its economic history.
This seems to be the distinctive feature of the Peru-
vian version of neoliberalism, as compared with other
similar experiments carried out in Latin America.1
In order to understand the logic behind this re-
turn to the past, we will briefly review the economic
growth of Peru from 1950 up to the present, set forth
on the basis of two elements: first, identification of
the periods through which the macroeconomic evolu-
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 The author wishes to express his gratitude for the comments
made by Waldo Mendoza, the assistance provided by Alejandro
Olivares, and the financial support of the International Develop-
ment Centre and the Canadian International Development
Agency. 1 See Seminario (1995) and Schuldt (1994).
tion of the country has passed in these 45 years and,
second, a description of the main changes which have
taken place in the growth strategy and the rate of
investment in each of those periods.
As we may see from figure 1, three main stages
may be distinguished in the long-term evolution of
the per capita GDP.2 The first stage (1950-1975) was
a period of rapid growth, interrupted by some brief
recessions (in 1958-1959 and 1967-1969), with the
per capita product growing at an average annual rate
of 2.5%. This first stage was also one of low inflation
by Peruvian standards, with an average rate of 10%
per year.
The second stage (1976-1990) may be described
as a long-lasting crisis with violent cycles of booms
and recessions;3 as may be seen from figure 1, by the
beginning of the 1990s the per capita product had
dropped back to the level it had attained 30 years
before. This was also a period of high inflation, cul-
minating in the hyperinflation of 1988-1990, at the
end of the Alan García administration (1985-1990);
leaving out these last three years, average inflation
stood at 83% per year. During the period of hyperin-
flation, price levels rose by a factor of 39 per year
(4049% per year), while the per capita product
dropped by the unprecedented amount of almost one-
third.
The third and final stage (1991-1997) repre-
sented a new period of stabilization and expansion in
which the per capita product grew by over 3% per
year, although without exceeding the maximum lev-
els registered in the past. Inflation showed a clear
downward tendency, standing at less than 10% per
year at the end of this phase.
It may be emphasized that the development
model or growth strategy which prevailed during
much of the first stage and was marked by a combi-
nation of rapid growth and low inflation was an al-
most pure primary-export strategy.
This primary-export model, with a small State
sector and the application of a policy of free trade,
lasted in Peru until well into the 1960s. According to
Thorp and Bertram (1978, part IV, Introduction), the
Peruvian economy between 1948 and the late 1960s
was the prime example in Latin America of that
dream of orthodox developmentalists: an export-led
system in which the entry of foreign capital and the
repatriation of profits were virtually unrestricted and
government intervention was kept to the minimum.
This Peruvian system was an anachronism in the
Southern Cone of Latin America,4 where the pre-
vailing model was based on import substitution in-
dustrialization, with protected domestic markets and
relatively high rates of inflation, and the primary-
export sector was one of the least dynamic in the
economy.5
The downfall of this primary-export model came
in spite of its good macroeconomic performance. The
crisis of the oligarchic State6 began quite late in Peru,
during the first Belaúnde administration (1963-1968),
which partly modified that model by embarking on a
moderate policy of import substitution industrializa-
tion which attracted a certain amount of foreign in-
vestment.7
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2 For a division into more detailed periods, see Vega-Centeno
(1989).
3 Two important studies on the cycles and trends in the Peruvian
economy during these 45 years (those by Seminario and Boullon
(1992) and Robles (1996)) identify a structural turning point in
the mid-1970s, after which the volatility of the macroeconomic
aggregates substantially increased.
4 According to Borricaud (1989), the Peruvian oligarchy  had
learned how to maintain their dominant position in a world and a
region where their foreign counterparts had already lost much of
their former power.
5 See Hofman, 1993.
6 Cotler (1994) states that this crisis took place when political
participation was spreading throughout the country to all levels
of society, leading to the questioning of the structure of land
ownership and the role of foreign capital, which were the pillars
of the system of domination.
7 Schydlowsky (1995) explains this by the fact that this industri-
alization began under a rather special combination of heavy
tariff protection and weak “exchange-rate protection”.
FIGURE 1
Peru: Per capita gross domestic product, 1950-1997
(Indexes, 1979=100)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
Subsequently, under the military regime of
General Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), the primary-
export model8 really was replaced by import substitu-
tion  industrialization. The industrialization strategy
became more radical, both in terms of the degree of
protection of the domestic market and the degree of
State intervention in the economy.9 Through the na-
tionalization of a considerable part of the foreign-
owned interests and the transfer to the State of part of
the assets of the oligarchy, a strong public-enterprise
sector was built up which came to control over 30%
of GDP. According to Fitzgerald (1985), the State was
responsible for three-quarters of exports, half of im-
ports, more than half of fixed investment, two-thirds
of bank credit and one-third of all employment in the
entrepreneurial sector.
The other point that should be stressed, then, is
that there were notable changes in the growth strat-
egy during the first stage, which was marked by rapid
growth and low inflation. This good macroeconomic
performance was compatible both with the primary-
export model and with the import substitution model.
In the second stage, marked by persistent stagna-
tion and high and growing inflation, no decisive
changes were made in the development model im-
posed by the structural reforms of Velasco Alvarado.
Two key features of this growth strategy persisted
throughout these 15 years: the major role played by
public enterprises and the heavy protection given to
manufacturing.
There were two major attempts to change this
development model, but both of them finally failed.
The first was connected with the programme for the
promotion of exports of manufactures applied in
1977-1980, while the main feature of the second was
the trade openness of 1979-1982.
According to Schydlowsky (1986), the boom in
non-traditional exports in 1977-1980 was attributable
to the combination of substantial support for exports
(an average of 27% of their FOB value), a devaluation
of 28% in real terms between 1976 and 1978, and a
shrinking domestic market (which contracted by 20%
or more between 1976 and 1978). In 1979, a new
system of incentives for non-traditional products was
introduced, with the undertaking that it would be kept
unchanged for the next ten years. It was believed that
the great moment for non-traditional exports had fi-
nally arrived. Nobody suspected at that time that the
new civil government that would take office in mid-
1980 would  reverse that policy before six months
were out.
As well as doing away with this successful pro-
gramme for the promotion of non-traditional exports,
the second Belaúnde administration (1980-1985) fur-
ther increased the trade openness10 begun in 1979
under the military regime of Morales Bermúdez
(1976-1980) and generated a significant exchange-
rate lag. The 1982-1983 balance of payments crisis,
associated with the onset of the external debt crisis,
put an end to this first experiment in the liberalization
of imports, which was the most direct forerunner of
the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s.
In the third and last phase, under the Fujimori
government, the growth strategy was once again radi-
cally altered. The structural reforms of the 1990s may
be seen as the almost perfect antithesis to the reforms
made under the Velasco Alvarado government (1968-
1975), or alternatively as a new version of those
made under the Odría government (1948-1956).
With the privatization of public enterprises and
an extremely radical unilateral trade openness proc-
ess,11 Peru returned in effect to the primary-export
model of the 1950s. There was a marked decline in
the importance of manufacturing, and whole
branches of the industrial structure disappeared. An
indicator of this process of de-industrialization was
that while in 1995 the GDP finally recovered the abso-
lute level that it had achieved in 1987, Peruvian
manufacturing output12 was almost 20% smaller.
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8 As noted by R. Thorp (1995, chapter IV) and Fitzgerald
(1985), this new growth strategy did not, however, neglect the
expansion of commodity exports.
9 See Thorp (1995), Fitzgerald (1985) and Schydlowsky and
Wicht (1979).
10 See Ferrari (1992) and Rojas (1996).
11 The para-tariff protection system for manufacturing was to-
tally dismantled and the system of cascading or stepped tariffs,
so typical of import substitution industrialization, was replaced
by a flat tariff along the lines of the Chilean system. Between
1990 and 1993, the average level of tariffs went down from 66%
to 16%, and in 1993, 98% of the total value of imports was
subject to a tariff of 15% (see Rojas, 1996; Ferrari, 1992; Ross-
ini, 1991). Furthermore, Peru suspended its participation in the
Andean Pact because of the stepped common tariff applied by
that integration agreement (see Vega, 1997 and Fairlie, 1996).
12 Defined as the output of   non-primary-commodity-based
manufacturing industry, thus excluding the branches directly
linked with the export of commodities (metal refining, produc-
tion of fish meal, etc.). See, in this respect, Banco Central de
Reserva del Perú (1996). With regard to de-industrialization, see
Jiménez, 1996.
Foreign capital, which went mainly to the export
mining sector and public utilities, once again occu-
pied a leading place in the economy, through the ac-
quisition of many of the privatized State enterprises.13
The closure of almost the entire State development
banking system, which played an important part in
the loan and deposit markets, should also be included
among the main reforms made in this period.14
It is interesting to compare the model imposed
by Odría with that applied four decades later by Fuji-
mori. Among their common features, González (1994)
mentions the openness of the trade and capital accounts
and a State which plays only a minimum part in the
economy and encourages foreign investment, especially
in the commodity export sector and public utilities,
through very favourable legislation, while among the
differences he notes that the public external debt now
has significant weight in the fiscal and external sector
accounts, unlike the earlier period.
In reality, the big difference is that real exports
have not yet expanded by the required amount. The
promise of a big expansion in mining exports in the
second half of the 1990s had been made the theoreti-
cal base for the Fujimori growth model, but so far the
real factor which has made economic growth possible
between 1993 and 1995 has been the enormous in-
flow of capital (mostly short-term capital and inflows
in respect of privatization operations), for which
there is no precedent in the last 45 years.
One way of appreciating this difference is shown
in figure 2, which highlights two facts. Firstly, that
there was an alternation of deficits and surpluses in
the trade balance during the Odría government, thus
giving a balanced level on average, whereas during
the Fujimori government the trade deficit is increas-
ingly large: equivalent to 20% of annual exports on
average. Secondly, that the trade balance and the for-
eign exchange reserves of the banking system (both
measured as a percentage of exports) have almost
always moved in the same direction over the 45 years
in question.15 The period from 1991 to 1997 repre-
sents the only lengthy exception to this rule. The
magnitude of the inflow of capital was particularly
marked in the first half of the 1990s, thus making
possible a notable increase in the foreign exchange
reserves, in spite of a growing trade deficit and
greater external debt service commitments.
How did investment behave in each of these
three main stages? Figure 3 shows total gross invest-
ment as a percentage of GDP between 1950 and 1997.
If we simplify the division into periods made by
Seminario and Boullon (1992), we can identify five
main cycles in the course of those 45 years. A first
investment cycle (in mining and export agriculture)
occurred in 1950-1960 in connection with the struc-
tural reforms made by Odría.
The second investment cycle, which covered the
period from 1960 to the early 1970s, was marked by
a clear decline in the rate of capital accumulation,
probably due to the uncertainty caused by the politi-
cal crisis of the oligarchic State.16
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13 Between 1991 and 1993, the government obtained very little
from the sale of public enterprises. Income from privatization
operations became significant as from 1994, with the sale of 29
enterprises for an amount equivalent to 35% of annual central
government tax revenue. In 1995, the sale of a further 28 enter-
prises and various other assets generated income equal to 12% of
tax revenue. In 1996, the income from 28 privatization opera-
tions increased once again to the equivalent of 25% of tax reve-
nue. In 1997, income from privatization operations went down
by over 70% compared with the previous year, amounting to the
equivalent of only 6% of tax revenue, and it was expected to go
down still further in 1998. Only exceptionally has public external
debt paper been accepted as a means of payment in the privatiza-
tion process.
14 See Rojas and Vilcapoma, 1996.
FIGURE 2
Peru: Trade balance and variation
in international reserves, 1950-1998 a
(As a percentage of exports of goods)
Source: Banco Central
a Up to September 1998.
15 This suggests that it was the real sector of the economy which
governed the rate at which the banking system accumulated
external assets.
16 See Cotler, 1994.
The third investment cycle, which began with
the Velasco Alvarado government and ended with
the onset of the external debt crisis in 1982, was
marked by the basic role played in it by public invest-
ment financed with external indebtedness. This
process of State accumulation was interrupted in
1976-1977 by an early external debt crisis associated
with the end of the “golden age” of the world econ-
omy;17 the solution of this crisis through a marked
increase in exports18 made possible a recovery in
public investment at the beginning of the second term
of Belaúnde. The 1982-1983 balance of payments
problems, connected with another external shock, fi-
nally put an end to this cycle.
The fourth cycle (1983-1993) was accompanied
by the total collapse of the rate of investment. The
burden of the external debt on the fiscal accounts,
the growing macroeconomic instability, and the hy-
perinflation unleashed by the economic policy of the
García administration (1985-1990), after the abortive
attempt to nationalize the banking system, were the
main causes of this decline in investment. It must be
emphasized, however, that the internal armed hostili-
ties which began in 1980 also seem to have been a
basic factor which gradually destroyed the confi-
dence of the private sector and increased the non-
economic  uncertainty, or  political risk, to extreme
levels. This led to a persistent contraction in private
investment, while the expatriation of capital in-
creased.19
The fifth and  final  investment cycle began in
1993, supported by a massive inflow of capital in
connection with the privatization of public enter-
prises and the repatriation of domestic capital. One
hypothesis holds that the capture of Abimael
Guzmán, the leader of Sendero Luminoso, was the
event that permitted the initiation of this cycle by
sharply reducing the political risk. An alternative hy-
pothesis, however, attributes this new investment to
the stabilization and structural reform programme
carried out by the Fujimori administration.
III
Interpretations of the Peruvian
growth process
There are three basic interpretations of this evolution
of the Peruvian economy between 1950 and 1995.
The first of them attributes this performance, whether
good or bad, to the growth strategy applied in each
period. For example, those who note that much of the
good macroeconomic performance in the first stage
took place under a primary-export model, or that al-
most the whole of the disastrous macroeconomic
performance in the second stage took place under an
import substitution model with heavy State interven-
tion, are tempted to convert this association into a
relation of causality, assuming that the development
model, that is to say, the structural reforms in one or
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FIGURE 3
Peru: Gross fixed capital formation, 1950-1997
(As a percentage of GDP)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
17 See Maddison, 1991.
18 In the late 1970s, two big investment projects, in the areas of
copper and petroleum, which had been initiated early in the
Velasco Alvarado government, came on stream, there was a rise
in the terms of trade, and there was a boom in non-traditional
exports. 19 See Figueroa, 1993.
the other direction, explain the long-term macroeconomic
performance.20
The second interpretation attributes this past be-
haviour  of the  Peruvian  economy to the recurrent
fluctuations in the international economy, which have
been particularly pronounced since the mid-1970s.21
Thus, those who note that the good macroeconomic
performance in the first stage coincides almost
exactly with the extremely favourable external con-
text created by the “golden age” of Western capital-
ism described by Maddison (1992) could equally
well conclude that it was this international economic
situation which explains this performance.22
From this point of view, it could also be argued
that the stagnation and high inflation of the 1980s
were the  result  of another adverse external shock,
similar to that which marked the end of the “golden
age” and set off the external debt crisis. Or it could
also be asserted that the inflow of capital in the first
half of the 1990s, associated with historically low
external interest rates,23 was decisive for the initiation
of the new period of price stability and expansion of
the aggregate product which marked the first half of
the 1990s throughout Latin America.
The third interpretation of this past experience
assigns a leading role to macroeconomic policy,24
holding that success or failure depend on the macro-
economic policies adopted during the period. As
Marfán and Bosworth (1994) assert in their evalu-
ation of the Chilean experience, whose success nor-
mally tends to be associated with structural reforms,
what  stands  out –particularly when appraising  the
economic events of the last ten years– is the clear
benefit of conventional macroeconomic policies em-
phasizing stable prices and stable growth of demand.
A classic example is the role played by macro-
economic policy in Europe during the “golden age”.
According to Maddison  (1991), the main achieve-
ment of government policy was not “fine-tuning”
but the success in feeding a demand boom  which
kept the economies in a situation of high employ-
ment. The pro-growth and pro-employment bias, and
the absence of deflationary policies with their crudely
perverse effects, were the features which most differ-
entiated post-war domestic policy from pre-war
policy. The achievements were greater than could
reasonably have been expected. The absence of risks
of recession in terms of production and the persist-
ence of satisfactory profits gave rise to an unprece-
dented investment boom.
Particular emphasis should be placed on the im-
portance of the macroeconomic policies adopted as a
reaction to the recurrent external shocks suffered by
an economy like that of Peru. It is this interaction
between macroeconomic policy and external shocks
which gives rise to either balance of payments crises
or  successful  adjustments: particular  events which
often determine the subsequent performance of the
economy in terms of growth and inflation.
As noted by Krugman (1988), a country which
suffers severe external shocks can consider itself
lucky if it only has to put up with a temporary reces-
sion and a spell of inflation rather than a persistent
decline in its growth expectations and a permanent
shift towards higher rates of inflation. He adds that
the macroeconomic policy response is the key to suc-
cessfully facing up to an adverse external shock.
Thus, for example, an observer who notes that
the turning-point in the macroeconomic performance
of Peru (the year 1975) coincides not only with an
external shock but also with a significant change in
the macroeconomic policy applied25 might be
tempted to extend the conclusions of Marfán and
Bosworth to the case of Peru. It might therefore be
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20 From a pro-industrialization perspective, Schydlowsky and
Wicht (1979) and Jiménez (1991) emphasize the intrinsic limita-
tions on a form of industrialization depending on imported inputs
and capital goods and aimed exclusively at the domestic market.
Paredes and Sachs (1990) and Hunt (1996), in contrast, take an
anti-industrialization approach.
21 See Krugman (1988).
22 Iguíñiz (1986), Frenkel, Fanelli and Rosenwurcel (1993) and
Taylor (1991) have stressed the importance of the external con-
text as the determining factor of macroeconomic performance.
Hofman (1993) shows that per capita GDP growth under the
import substitution industrialization model was high in Latin
America during the “golden age”.
23 See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993).
24 See Thorp (1995), who emphasizes the role of macroeconomic
management.
25 In the mid-1970s, the system of a fixed exchange rate was
replaced with a movable rate with a target real exchange rate,
and public prices were made a key instrument in fiscal policy.
See Thorp (1995) and Fitzgerald (1985).
argued that the inflation and stagnation marking the
second stage (from 1975 to 1990) are explained by
the interaction of adverse external shocks and this
change in macroeconomic policy.26
To sum up, then, a prudent conclusion would be
that the long-term macroeconomic results do not only
depend on the growth strategy followed, but also the
international context and macroeconomic policy.
IV
Economic fluctuations and external shocks
Both historical27 and econometric28 studies suggest
that an essential component in the form of macro-
economic regulation prevailing during the period
from 1950 to 1990 was the particular blend of fiscal,
credit and exchange-rate policies applied in response
to an adverse or destabilizing external shock (such as
a fall in the terms of trade or a rise in international
interest rates). This policy mix normally included a
devaluation, credit restrictions and a contractionary
fiscal policy.
This way of handling adverse external shocks,
together with certain structural features of the Peru-
vian economy, has given rise to set of empirical regu-
larities or stylized events in the short-term dynamics
of the economy. These facts are connected with the
relations that exist between the short-term cycle of
the level of economic activity, the rate of inflation,
and the evolution of the external sector (exchange
rate, trade balance and foreign currency reserves).
The main point is that the periods of recession
are at the same time periods of rising inflation29
and of balance of payments crises. It is worth
emphasizing that the basic features of these short-
term dynamics, especially the balance of payments
crisis-rising inflation-recession chain, are common to
the three stages in which we divided these 45 years.
This chain has various links. The first link con-
nects devaluations30 with an appreciable decline in
the foreign exchange reserves of the banking system.
The regularity of this fact reflects a policy rule which
prevailed during these 45 years because of the un-
varying reaction of the monetary authorities, since
the exchange rate has always been managed, one way
or another, by the Central Bank.
The second link arises from the observation that
the beginning of all the major recessions during these
45  years (namely, in  1953,1957,1967, 1975, 1982
and 1987) coincided with or was preceded by a drop
in the reserves due to a deficit on the trade balance;31
none of the declines in the international reserves were
due exclusively to outflows of capital. Of the six re-
cessions mentioned above, the first five coincide with
adverse  external shocks.32 Two of them (those in
1975 and 1982) were associated with external public
debt crises (lower disbursements and rises in interna-
tional interest rates).33
NEOLIBERAL REFORMS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN PERU  OSCAR DANCOURT
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 958
26 In order to close the external and fiscal gaps generated by the
increase in the external debt burden, the instruments used were
the exchange rate and public prices. First of all their real values
rose sharply, and subsequently their nominal values were in-
dexed to past inflation.
27 For a detailed analysis  of  all the Peruvian stabilization at-
tempts since the 1950s, see Thorp (1996).
28 See Seminario and Boullon (1992), Robles (1996), Terrones
and Calderón (1993) and Vilcapoma (1996).
29 A noteworthy empirical regularity of the Peruvian economy is
that the rises in inflation coincide with recessions. Three recent
studies on the Peruvian experience Seminario and Boullon
(1992), Terrones and Calderón (1993) and Robles (1996), which
use different methods for separating the  cycle from the trend
levels– find that inflation is anticyclical with respect to the level
of economic activity.
30 That is to say, devaluations during the period 1950-1975, or
increases in the rate of devaluation during the period 1976-1995.
31 See Vilcapoma (1996). The trade balance may deteriorate due
to external shocks and/or domestic factors. What  we wish  to
emphasize is that if the trade deficit –whatever its origin– means
that the foreign exchange reserves go down, this marks the be-
ginning of a recessionary cycle. During the 1990s, thanks to the
inflow of capital, it has been possible for a growing trade deficit
to exist at the same time as reactivation of the level of economic
activity and an increase in the foreign exchange reserves.
32 See Dancourt, Mendoza and Vilcapoma (1997).
33 See Ugarteche (1996) and Cline (1981).
The third link in the chain is the observation that
during these 45 years there was practically no impor-
tant episode of rising inflation which was not associ-
ated with a devaluation or an increase in the rate of
devaluation.
To sum up this short-term dynamic, we can say
that during the period when there was a fixed nomi-
nal exchange rate (1950-1975), the recessions were
associated with declines in the reserves and individ-
ual devaluation measures which caused a transitory
rise in the rate of inflation. Once the balance of pay-
ments crisis was over, inflation slackened once again.34
There are various factors which would appear to
have governed this short-term dynamic. The first is
that unvarying policy rule which causes the authori-
ties to devalue the exchange rate only when the for-
eign exchange reserves go down. The second is that a
rise in the real exchange rate may be recessionary and
inflationary in the short term, in line with the Taylor-
Krugman  model (see Krugman and Taylor, 1978).
The third is that a rise in the real exchange rate has
normally formed part of a package of measures for
dealing  with  a balance of  payments crisis;  such a
package generally includes restrictive fiscal and
credit policies.35
Table 1 shows the correlations between the growth
rates of aggregate GDP,  with different  lags and ad-
vances, and the growth rates of a set of macroeconomic
variables (prices, the exchange rate, public expenditure,
credit, the trade balance, etc.). This table makes it pos-
sible to classify the various macroeconomic variables
as procyclical or anticyclical with respect to GDP, ac-
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TABLE 1
Correlation between growth rates of GDP
and of other macroeconomic variables, 1950-1996
Coefficients of correlation
Relative Standard Auto-Growth rate standard Lags Advances
deviationa deviation correlations
-2 -1 0 1 2
G b 3.0 15.7 0.44* 0.08 0.48** 0.62** 0.45** 0.11
T c 2.7 13.8 0.33* -0.30 0.11 0.64** 0.50** 0.42**
L d 4.0 20.9 0.41** -0.24 0.15 0.58** 0.30 0.23
P e 234.1 1 217.1 0.36 -0.28 0.53** -0.44** -0.20 -0.21
E f 139.1 723.2 0.15 -0.20 -0.35* -0.47** -0.34* -0.27
E/P g 4.2 21.7 -0.42* 0.12 0.42** -0.03 -0.32* 0.05
X h 1.8 9.6 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.46**
M i 3.0 15.7 0.27 -0.18 0.41** 0.65** 0.12 -0.21
CM j 6.0 31.2 -0.30* -0.31* 0.09 0.43** 0.00 0.08
Levels
T-Gk 0.24 -0.35* -0.05 0.24 0.36* 0.38
X-Ml 0.56* -0.23 -0.53** -0.30* 0.15 0.24
A-RINm 0.32* -0.14** -0.19 0.14 0.19 0.44**
Source: Dancourt, Mendoza and Vilcapoma (1997).
* Significant at 95%.
** Significant at 99%.
a Ratio of standard deviation of variable to that of GDP.
b Real expenditure of central government.
c Real tax revenue of central government.
d Total real credit of banking system to private sector.
e Consumer Price Index.
f Nominal exchange rate at end of period.
g Real exchange rate at end of period.
h Real exports.
i Real imports.
j Index of import capacity.
k Saving on current account without capital inflows.
l Trade balance.
m Flow of international reserves of the banking system.
34 In contrast, when an attempt was made to fix the real ex-
change rate and real public prices (roughly speaking, in the pe-
riod 1976-1990) inflation did not slacken as soon as the balance
of payments crisis was over.
35 The studies by Seminario and Boullon (1992), Robles (1996),
Terrones and Calderón (1993) and Vilcapoma (1996) find that
the real exchange rate is anticyclical, that real wages are procy-
clical, and that credit for the private sector is procyclical and
much more volatile than GDP. Vilcapoma (1996) also shows that
some components of public expenditure are procyclical.
cording to whether the coefficient of correlation is
positive or negative. As it would not be appropriate
to try to represent the structure of lags and advances
of the different  macroeconomic  variables  with  re-
spect to GDP on the basis of annual data, we shall
refer only to the current correlations.
These coefficients of correlation between the
GDP growth rates and the various macroeconomic
variables cover the whole period 1950-1996, without
drawing any distinction between phases of boom or
recession, and they sum up in a single number the
type and degree of association of the fluctuations in
the level of activity with those variables.
In general terms, table 1 confirms the main
stylized facts described earlier. A first result is that
inflation and devaluation are clearly anticyclical
(they rise in times of recession and go down in boom
periods). A second result is that public expenditure
and real credit are highly procyclical (they go up in
boom periods and go down in recessions). A third
result is that imports and import capacity are clearly
procyclical, whereas the trade balance is anticycli-
cal36 (it deteriorates in boom periods and improves in
recessions). Finally, we see that taxes are procyclical
and that the primary central government fiscal sur-
plus is acyclical.37
Among the anomalous results (anomalous with
respect to the pattern of booms and recessions we
described) is, firstly, the fact that the real exchange
rate is acyclical in current terms.38 Secondly, there is
the fact that the variations in the foreign exchange
reserves of the banking system are acyclical in cur-
rent terms. This may be because booms do not display
such a systematic or regular pattern as recessions.
V
Stabilization and dollarization
Although it is possible today to apply a faithful
replica of the growth strategy of 40 years ago, it is
not possible to do the same in the field of macroe-
conomic policy. The basic idea in this section is that
the policy mix used in the first stage (from 1950 to
1975) to deal successfully with adverse external
shocks cannot be applied in the 1990s.
As we shall see, the financial liberalization
measures of the 1990s have blocked the mechanisms
traditionally used in the Peruvian economy to deal
with external shocks, by notably reducing the power
of monetary policy: today, the Central Bank is no
longer capable of imposing credit restrictions, nor is
it easy for it to devalue the currency.
Two main macroeconomic policy systems may
be identified during the Fujimori administration. In
the first period (1990-1992), the macroeconomic
policy mix used consisted of a monetary target (the
Central Bank regulated the amount of domestic
money in circulation by buying or selling dollars)
and active fixing of public prices, which was the
key fiscal policy instrument.
In this system, there was a clear division of la-
bour between monetary policy and fiscal policy.
Monetary policy was indirectly responsible for con-
trolling inflation, by fixing decreasing rates of growth
of the amount of money in circulation. Fiscal policy,
for its part, generated a primary surplus designed to
cover payments on the external debt by raising the
real prices of fuels for the public.39
The restrictive monetary policy caused exchange-
rate appreciation which, in turn, checked the rise in
price levels, but the increase in public prices acted in
the opposite direction. These dual effects explain
why the disinflation in 1990-1992 was slow and dis-
played pronounced setbacks associated with marked
fluctuations in the rate of devaluation and frequent
shocks caused by public prices. Even so, this experi-
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36 The anticyclical nature of the trade balance is observed with a
certain amount of lag (first the GDP rises and then the trade
balance deteriorates, and vice versa).
37 We were expecting it to be procyclical, i.e., that it would have
a destabilizing effect. See Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi
(1997).
38 We believe this is connected in part with the definition of the
real exchange rate used, which does not incorporate interna-
tional inflation. It is clear, however, that all the recessions that
took place between 1950 and 1996 began with a rise in the real
exchange rate.
39 There was an intermediate period, in the second half of 1990,
in which the anti-inflationary policy consisted of fixing the
nominal exchange rate and public prices, after the style of the
heterodox plans of the 1980s, the Bolivian experience of 1985,
or the Argentine experience with Cavallo. See Dancourt, 1996.
ence serves to confirm once more the effectiveness of
overvaluation of the exchange-rate as a means of
controlling inflation, in the case of Peru.
The process of controlling hyperinflation in Peru
has been notably slow compared with similar proc-
esses in economies that were also dollarized, such as
those of Bolivia (1985) or Argentina (1991). From
the beginning of the stabilization programme until
the point at which a rate of inflation (in terms of the
consumer price index) of less than 2% per month was
registered for three consecutive months, the Peruvian
stabilization process took 37 months (from August
1990 to September 1993), the Argentine process took
four months (from April to August 1991) and that of
Bolivia took 13 months (from August 1985 to Sep-
tember 1986).
Such a policy mix did serve, however, to recon-
cile the disinflation process with the increase in the
external debt service, which it had not been possible
to do in the 1980s. The two immediate objectives of
the economic programme of the Fujimori administra-
tion  were to  end hyperinflation and  normalize the
country’s relations with the international financial
community. This latter objective meant resuming the
servicing of the external public debt (figure 4), first
to the multilateral agencies, then to the member gov-
ernments of the Paris Club, and finally to the interna-
tional commercial banking system within the context
of the Brady Plan.
The period of application of this policy mix, as
may be seen from table 2, was marked by slow disin-
flation, stagnation of the level of economic activity at
its lowest level, and enormous over-valuation of the
real exchange rate.
The mechanism behind this appreciation of the
real exchange rate may be summed up as follows. On
the one hand, through the purchase of dollars, mone-
tary policy fixes a certain rate of increase of the do-
mestic money supply. On the other hand, fiscal policy
pushes the rate of inflation above the growth of the
money supply through periodic readjustments in public
prices, thus reducing the real amount of money.
In view of the level of activity, this means that
the public lacks national currency (means of ex-
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TABLE 2
Peru: Macroeconomic indicators, 1991-1997
(Annual variation)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Non-primary sector a 3.6 -1.7 6.2 14.1 9.5 1.7 9.7
Primary sector b 1.85 -5.1 8.0 11.6 2.3 4.6 4.7
GDP 2.9 -2.8 6.5 13.1 7.0 2.6 7.4
Domestic demand less imports 2.0 -3.1 7.5 11.7 7.0 -0.3 4.6
Public investment 6.4 13.9 12.8 21.9 14.5 -8.5 9.0
Exports 6.0 2.5 3.3 17.5 7.0 11.4 16.3
Trade deficit c -8.3 -9.7 -17.0 -21.3 -38.8 -33.9 -30.5
Index of GDP (1987=100) 79.8 78.4 83.3 94.3 100.8 103.0 111.2
Inflation 139.2 56.7 39.5 15.4 10.2 11.8 6.5
Devaluation 85.9 69.8 31.9 1.4 6.5 12.1 4.7
Price of fuels 114.1 42.5 41.7 4.4 6.3 32.2 23.4
Total credit to private sector 284.8 96.4 74.0 65.0 43.6 49.6 30.1
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (1995 and 1998).
a Comprises non-primary commodity-based industry, construction, government, commerce, etc.
b Comprises agriculture, fisheries, mining and primary commodity-based manufacturing.
c As a percentage of exports.
FIGURE 4
Peru: Service paid on the public debt, 1987-1997
(As a percentage of exports of goods)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
change) for carrying out its transactions. In order to
obtain this money, the public can immediately sell
dollars (the value reserve par excellence in a dollar-
ized economy like that of Peru) or, in the medium-
term, change its habits as regards the use of money,
becoming accustomed to carry out more and more
transactions directly in dollars.40
The hypothesis put forward in this article is that
it was the first of these reactions which was the main
force behind  the exchange rate over-valuation. As
may be seen from figure 5, most of the exchange lag
which marks the Fujimori administration took place
at the beginning of the stabilization programme; in
August 1990 the general price level rose by a factor
of five because the government raised fuel prices by
a factor of 30, the real monetary base shrank by two-
thirds, and the real free exchange rate sank to half the
level of the previous month.
Subsequently, in addition to these factors there
was the more gradual impact of the inflow of foreign
capital, which put downward pressure on the exchange
rate, altering the relative supply of soles and dollars.41
Under the second macroeconomic policy system
(1993-1995), the policy mix was changed. In order
to explain the change from the previous system to
this one, it must be borne in mind firstly that public
income from privatization operations became a
significant factor as from 1993-1994 and, secondly,
that  Fujimori was seeking  re-election in the 1995
elections.
The real price of fuels gradually went down, and
public expenditure came to be the preferred fiscal
policy instrument. The monetary targets were re-
placed with exchange-rate targets which appreciably
reduced the permissible range of fluctuation of the
exchange rate until it came close to a fixed exchange
rate. One indicator of this transition is the relative
volatility42 of the exchange rate with respect to the
amount of money in circulation, which went down
from 2.34 in 1991-1992 to 0.21 in 1993-1995.
As may be seen from table 2, the period in which
this second policy mix was applied was marked by a
rapid decline in inflation –associated with the virtual
fixing of the exchange rate and of nominal public
prices–, a notable reactivation of economic activity,
connected with the expansionary fiscal policy, and a
much smaller degree of appreciation of the real ex-
change rate. This marked the close of the inflationary
cycle which had begun in the mid-1970s.
In both periods, the inflow of capital made it
possible for the foreign exchange reserves to increase
in spite of the growing trade deficit, thus providing a
way out from the conflict between price stability and
external equilibrium which has marked the Peruvian
economy over these 45 years. (If the exchange rate is
used to check price rises, the trade balance deterio-
rates, and vice versa). Clearly, this exchange rate over-
valuation –and its anti-inflationary impact– could not
have lasted without the inflow of foreign capital.
It might be concluded from this brief description
that the macroeconomic policies applied and the rate
of inflation in the period from 1993 to 1997 came
quite close to the system of a fixed exchange rate and
10% annual inflation observed at the height of the
primary-export model.
This similarity is more apparent than real, how-
ever. As already noted, the credit and exchange policy
mix which was used in the 1950s and 1960s to cope
with external shocks cannot be used in the 1990s, basi-
cally because two structural reforms associated with
financial liberalization –the dollarization of the bank-
ing system and the opening up of the capital account–
prevent monetary policy from operating properly.
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40 They can, of course, also seek more bank credit or sell off
their stocks of goods. The first of these actions does not repre-
sent a serious objection for the argument put forward here, while
the second has not been observed in the Peruvian economy.
41 Ruiz (1995) compares the two hypotheses econometrically
(monetary policy versus inflow of capital) and reaches a conclu-
sion in line with the view that the exchange rate appreciation was
generated directly by the monetary policy.
42 That is to say, the standard deviation of the monthly devalu-
ation, divided by the standard deviation of the monthly growth of
the monetary base.
FIGURE 5
Peru: Real exchange rate, January 1989-July 1998
(August 1990=100)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
In order to understand this result, it is worth de-
scribing the institutional framework in which mone-
tary policy operates. In the Peruvian financial system
there is no market for debt paper or public bonds, and
the stock exchange has little macroeconomic impor-
tance. Instead, it is the banking system and an exten-
sive and well-organized market for exchanging
dollars which are the two central institutions in the
financial system.
These two basic institutions have been combined
in various ways from 1980 to the present. During the
Belaúnde administration (1980-1985), the banking
system accepted deposits and granted loans in both
national currency and foreign currency, a system of
mini-devaluations was applied, and the free exchange
rate closely followed the official rate.
In the first years of the García administration
(1985-1987) the banking system was de-dollarized, a
system of multiple fixed exchange rates was applied,
and there was a stable differential between the free
exchange rate and the highest official exchange rate.
Subsequently, between 1988 and 1990, hyperinflation
led to the dollarization of the private sector’s finan-
cial holdings, but now outside the banking system;
the official exchange rate gradually lost all significance,
and the foreign exchange market expanded consider-
ably, with the dollar consolidating its position as the
main reserve asset of the Peruvian economy.
Finally, with the Fujimori administration, the de-
velopment banking system was closed down, the pri-
vate commercial banks were once again authorized to
accept deposits and grant loans in foreign currency,
and a flexible exchange-rate system was introduced.
At the present time, three-quarters of all loans and
deposits are dollarized, and the exchange-rate system,
as already mentioned, is increasingly close to a fixed
exchange-rate system, although without any explicit
commitment on the part of the monetary authority.43
This latter dollarization of the banking system is
the combined result of this authorization and the ex-
change-rate float. With this float, the Central Bank
gained the capacity to control the amount of domestic
money in circulation. This control also prevented the
private sector from automatically remonetizing itself
by ceasing to hoard the foreign currency accumulated
during the period of hyperinflation once that period
was over, as usually occurs with a fixed exchange-
rate system.
Consequently, the dollar bills went to the banks
instead of being changed into soles. Introducing the
dollar into the banking system meant associating the
foreign currency with the saving of transaction costs
characteristic of a system of bank payments, as well
as converting it into an interest-bearing asset.
There was thus a massive increase in deposits in
dollars, as may be seen from table 3. This increase
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TABLE 3
Peru: Monetary indicators, 1990-1997a
Commercial banks Interna-
tional
Monetary Foreign currency Foreign currency Interna- Real annual interest rates reserves
base deposits loans tional of the
Year (1989 = liabilities Foreign currency Local currency banking
100) Billions % of Billions % of (% of system
of total of total foreign (Millions
US$ deposits US$ loans currency Loans Deposits Loans Deposits of
loans) dollars)
1990 69 0.756 63 0.451 64 15 ... ... ... ... 531
1991 56 2.163 75 1.242 68 7 -10.0 -19.4 43.9 -29.6 1 304
1992 58 2.627 75 1.755 76 13 26.3 13.7 72.0 -24.2 2 174
1993 56 3.875 82 2.732 79 14 9.0 -0.07 23.6 -18.2 2 793
1994 72 5.280 77 3.308 74 15 1.0 -8.0 20.5 -7.0 4 737
1995 89 6.090 74 5.426 71 19 13.2 2.5 21.1 -0.3 6 693
1996 79 8.007 75 7.268 74 23 17.1 6.0 16.8 -1.2 8 862
1997 85 8.976 73 8.537 77 28 13.7 3.5 22.5 3.2 7 963
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
a Data at end of each period.
43 Exchange-rate floating still occupies a leading place in the
official discourse of the Peruvian economic authorities.
came from three sources. First, there was the entry
into the domestic banking system of the dollar bills
saved up during the period of hyperinflation. Second,
there was the repatriation of capital and the inflow of
short-term capital by non-residents. Third, there were
the loans obtained abroad by the local commercial
banking system as from late 1994. It should be noted
that the inflow of foreign exchange generated by the
privatization of public enterprises (whose counterpart
mainly takes the form of foreign direct investment)
does not represent a fourth source, since this money
remained outside the country and outside the domes-
tic banking system;44 it would only represent such a
source if the government financed its expenditure by
selling these dollars to the public.
The consequences of this process of dollarization
of deposits for the relations of the commercial bank-
ing system with its debtors and with the Central Bank
have been very far-reaching.
First, the increase in deposits in dollars made
possible a significant expansion in bank credit to the
private sector. Second, apparently because of the de-
sire of the banks to tie their assets and liabilities by
currencies in order to avoid exchange risk, this ex-
pansion in credit has led to the dollarization of the
indebtedness of non-financial enterprises (table 3).
Third, the increase in bank deposits in foreign
currency has also represented a considerable increase
in the net international reserves of the Central Bank,
through the high compulsory reserve rate applicable
to these deposits; at the end of 1996, these compul-
sory reserves represented 40% of the total foreign
exchange reserves of the monetary authority. This ar-
rangement can also have the opposite effect, however,
since a run on bank deposits in dollars is automat-
ically also a run on the Central Bank reserves.
Fourth, this process has radically altered the
terms in which the Central Bank must fulfill its role
of lender of last resort in the event of a run by domes-
tic or foreign depositors; thus, the foreign exchange
reserves of the Central Bank now not only fulfill the
traditional function of providing international liquid-
ity to cushion the impact of the various external
shocks to which the Peruvian economy is exposed,
but also represent the ultimate guarantee of the stabil-
ity of the national banking system.45
Within this institutional framework, monetary
policy operates both through the dollar market and
through the banking system. The main monetary pol-
icy instruments are now intervention in the exchange
market (purchase or sale of dollars to regulate the
amount of money or fix the exchange rate), compul-
sory reserve requirements on bank deposits, the rate
of interest or remuneration paid by the Central Bank
on the compulsory reserves deposited by the com-
mercial banks, and the financial assets (previously
deposits, but now  securities issued by the Central
Bank itself) which the monetary authority can offer
the commercial banks.
In view of this institutional context, the exchange
rate and the supply of bank credit are the two main trans-
mission belts linking monetary policy with the level of
economic activity, the trade balance and inflation.46
However, the dollarization of the banking system
and the free movement of capital have markedly re-
duced the power of monetary policy, by inhibiting
these two main channels of transmission. Firstly, the
monetary authorities cannot regulate the aggregate
supply of credit, whatever the exchange-rate regime
in force.
If the Central Bank is willing to allow a clean
float of the exchange rate, the monetary authorities
could take action (through the purchase or sale of
dollars and/or Central Bank paper) to regulate the
monetary base and the supply of bank credit in do-
mestic currency: that is to say, only a quarter of the
total supply of credit, even in the best of cases. The
problem is that, because of the dollarization of the
economy, the Central Bank has no way of regulating
the volume of credit in dollars, which represents
three-quarters of the total supply, without limiting the
free movement of capital in some way.47
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44 At the end of 1996, these funds represented 37% of the total
foreign exchange reserves of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru.
45 According to Seminario (1995), dollarization has given rise to
a monetary system which combines the systems based on free
and fixed exchange rates. In reality, the Central Bank issues two
currencies. The first of them (bank deposits in dollars) has a
fixed parity with the dollar and is 100% backed by international
assets. The second currency is the Peruvian sol, which has a free
parity with the dollar.
46 Seminario (1995) and Dancourt and Mendoza (1996) both
present models with these features. Ruiz (1995), using the
autoregressive vectors technique, concludes that the main chan-
nel for the transmission of changes in money issue appears to be
the exchange rate, not interest rates.
47 Of course, if the banking system were de-dollarized, the
Central Bank could regulate the aggregate supply of credit by
adopting an exchange-rate float, without any need to interfere
with the free movement of capital.
Secondly, the dollarization of the banking system
also blocks the other channel for the transmission of
monetary policy, which operates through the ex-
change rate. In these circumstances, enterprises and
families who receive their income in soles have their
indebtedness denominated in dollars. If it is accepted
that the Central Bank can bring about an appreciation
in the real exchange rate by raising the nominal price
of the dollar, then a devaluation means raising real
interest rates and the real debt burden.
Because  of inflation, the real  average  cost  of
credit or the real debt burden depend directly on the
interest  rates in dollars  (which  follow the interna-
tional levels, taking into account compulsory reserve
requirements and country risk), the rate of devalu-
ation, the interest rate in soles, and the relative pro-
portions of the credit granted in soles and dollars.
The stylized fact is that the real average rate on loans
closely follows the rate of devaluation, as shown in
figure 6.
Thus, a midi- or maxi-devaluation can abruptly
increase the overdue debt portfolio of the banks, with
the risk of bringing on a banking crisis. This effect of
a possible maxi-devaluation has considerably strength-
ened the coalition of interests opposing such a meas-
ure, by including among its members both the banks
and their debtors. The strength of this coalition, and
the fear of further aggravating an external imbalance
with a banking crisis, prevent the Central Bank from
using the exchange rate as it did in 1950-1975.
In short, the monetary authorities of the 1990s
cannot restrict credit, nor can they easily carry out
significant devaluations.
In reality, the problem is even more complex,
because Peruvian fiscal policy in the 1990s has little
flexibility, on account of the size of the external pub-
lic debt commitments. Let us assume that the net pay-
ments in respect of the external debt (debt service
less fresh disbursements) are positive, that tax reve-
nue depends  on the  level of  activity, and that the
policy rule is that the primary fiscal surplus is equal
to the net payments on the external public debt. In
these conditions, in which the government does not
receive any loans from the domestic banking system,
fiscal expenditure ceases to be a policy tool and be-
comes an adjustment or endogenous variable. In
other words, public expenditure will depend directly
on the level of economic activity and inversely on the
real debt burden, while the latter, for its part, will
depend directly both on international interest rates
and on the real exchange rate.
In view of the rates of taxation, this fiscal system
not only represents a powerful channel for the trans-
mission of external shocks (for example, if interna-
tional interest rates rise, public expenditure falls) but
also functions as an automatic destabilizer. When the
level of activity goes down for any reason and tax
revenue diminishes, public expenditure also goes
down, thus further strengthening the initial recession-
ary impulse. It is no longer possible to raise public
expenditure in order to prevent the onset of a reces-
sionary cycle. Nor is it possible to do this in order to
offset the impact of a devaluation (if this is of a re-
cessionary nature, because it causes real wages to go
down and/or raises real interest rates) or of a restric-
tive credit policy.
If public expenditure includes, for example, an
unemployment insurance scheme, then the system
acts as an automatic stabilizer. Expenditure goes up
when the level of activity goes down, and vice versa.
This system assumes that the primary fiscal deficit
(or surplus) is a freely adjustable variable, i.e., a vari-
able whose value is not fixed exogenously  by the
debt payment requirements.
Of course in the short term the use of the resources
obtained from privatization operations48 –or greater
external indebtedness– could prevent the operation of
this automatic destabilizer, leaving open the possibil-
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FIGURE 6
Peru: Real interest rate on loans and
rate of devaluation, January 1993-July 1998
(Annual rates; mobile quarterly averages)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
48 At the end of 1996, such resources were equivalent to 40% of
annual fiscal income.
ity of increasing public expenditure when the level of
activity goes down. However, the future trajectory of
the public external debt service commitments sug-
gests that the problem will not easily be solved.49
Thus, the feasible set of macroeconomic policy
mixes is severely restricted. This is a structural defect
of the present macroeconomic policy system, if it is
acknowledged that the normal handling of the current
economic situation –and not just the management of
adverse external shocks– should be the responsibility
of monetary policy rather than fiscal policy, because
of its greater flexibility and smaller relative power.
VI
The tequila effect (1995) and the
Russian crisis (1998)
A description of these two macroeconomic situations
marked by a financial crisis will make it possible to
identify more clearly the nature of the connections
that the Peruvian economy currently has with the in-
ternational financial markets, as well as illustrating
how some nerve centres of the prevailing macro-
economic policy system operate and what their limi-
tations are.
In mid-1995, the expansionary cycle that the
Peruvian economy had been experiencing since 1993
was abruptly interrupted. The growth rate of the
non-primary sector of the economy,50 which is the
sector that responds to fiscal and monetary policies,
fell abruptly to 1.7% in 1996, after having stood at
9.5% in 1995 (table 2). In contrast, the primary sec-
tor, which comprises agriculture and commodity ex-
port activities, and whose level of production is
determined basically   by   supply-side factors, in-
creased its growth rate between 1995 and 1996 from
2.3% to 4.6% per year.
The interruption in this growth cycle was not
caused by an adverse external shock –the tequila
effect– as occurred in Argentina. It is true that in the
first quarter of 1995 there were all the symptoms of
an outflow of short-term capital, but this phenome-
non did not display the virulence observed in other
parts  of Latin  America. Foreign currency  deposits
went down, there was a fall in the foreign exchange
reserves of the banking system, dollar interest rates
rose, the stock exchange slumped, and the Central
Bank had to assume its role of lender of last resort to
the commercial banking system and intervene in the
exchange market.
However, this outflow of short-term capital did
not have a great deal of effect on the economy, basi-
cally because it did not give rise to an appreciable
increase in the real exchange rate or a reduction in the
supply of bank credit. As we saw earlier, these are the
two transmission belts linking monetary policy and fi-
nancial crises with the real sector of the economy.
This relative feebleness of the tequila effect may
be explained first of all by the nature of the Peruvian
financial system. As there is no public securities
market and the stock exchange is only small, Lima
was not an international financial centre capable of
attracting a significant portion of the short-term non-
resident capital that went to the Latin American
markets in the first half of the 1990s. It was presum-
ably this capital which was sensitive to United States
interest rates or to events such as the Mexican crisis
in late 1994.
Secondly, most of the short-term capital inflows
into the Peruvian economy which took place up to
1994 should probably be classified as repatriation of
capital. Such capital is not really volatile short-term
capital. The fact is that long-term political considera-
tions –such as the defeat of subversive movements–
may carry a lot of weight in deciding whether or not
to repatriate capital.
In other words, a financial system based mainly
on the banks and an inflow of capital which was not
very sensitive to external interest rates caused the Pe-
ruvian economy to be relatively disconnected from
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49 See Ugarteche, 1996.
50 The non-primary sector comprises manufacturing (other than
that based on the processing of primary resources), construction,
commerce, etc.
the United States financial markets, even though the
Peruvian neoliberal programme radically opened up
the capital account in the early 1990s. This explains
why there was no tequila effect in Peru. Unlike Chile,
where this was the result of deliberate policy deci-
sions, in Peru this relative disconnection  from  the
international financial markets was merely the result
of circumstances.51
As may be seen from figure 7, the 1990s has
been marked by a big inflow of capital, which was
especially marked during the three-year period 1994-
1996. Thus, the cooling  down of  the economy in
1996 coincided with an enormous inflow of capital
equivalent to some 80% of exports. This inflow of
short- and long-term capital only went down appre-
ciably quite recently, in 1997. Likewise, figure 8
shows that the international reserves of the banking
system grew rapidly from 1994 to the beginning of
1997, when they stabilized at around US$8.5 billion.
The interruption in the economic reactivation
was entirely due to a violent turnaround in fiscal
policy which began in mid-1995 and became  still
more marked in 1996. The origin of this turnaround
is to be found in the Letter of Intent which the
Government signed with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in 1995, undertaking to take active
measures to cool down the economy.
It may be seen from table 2 that the slump in the
growth rate of the Peruvian economy in 1996 was
due to the contraction in absolute terms in domestic
demand less imports. Of the various components of
domestic demand, that which displays the most vola-
tile  behaviour is, paradoxically, public investment,
which went down by 8.5% during 1996 after having
grown by 15% the year before. The other indicator
of the severity of the budget adjustment is that the
public sector primary fiscal surplus significantly in-
creased in spite of the cooling-down of the economy
(table 4).
There are three factors which can explain this
turnaround. Firstly, the Mexican crisis convinced the
IMF that a persistent trade deficit could be dangerous
if it was financed with capital that could suddenly
leave the country, and the policy conclusion was that
it was necessary to cool down the economy in order
to reduce the trade imbalance. The second factor was
connected with the political cycle of public expendi-
ture: after the re-election of Fujimori at the beginning
of 1995 there was no longer much government resis-
tance to a cut in such expenditure. Moreover –and
this was no less important– the fiscal accounts had to
adapt to the increase in external debt service due to
the agreements made in 1995-1996 with the creditor
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51 These circumstances have been changing rapidly since 1995,
however, with the growing short-term external indebtedness of
the local commercial banking  system. This  process, which is
described later in this article, strengthens the links between ex-
ternal  interest  rates  and  the cost and  availability of domestic
credit, on the one hand, and the exchange rate, on the other. For
an analysis of the different effects of the rise in external interest
rates on a dollarized banking system, see Dancourt and
Mendoza, 1996.
FIGURE 7
Peru: Net inflow of capital
(total and short-term), 1987-1997
(As a percentage of exports of goods)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
FIGURE 8
Peru: Net international reserves of the
banking system, January 1994-July 1998
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
governments grouped together in the Paris Club and
with the international private banks within the con-
text of the Brady Plan.52
The plan was that the cooling down of the econ-
omy would be achieved through a strong fiscal ad-
justment, aided by a restrictive monetary policy. As
may be seen from table 2, however, what really hap-
pened was that the recessionary fiscal policy, whose
main instrument was a cut in public investment in
infrastructure, was accompanied by a big expansion
in credit, which took place against the explicit wishes
of the monetary authority.
The monetary policy applied in 1995-1996 could
only be termed restrictive if we guide ourselves ex-
clusively by the performance of the national-currency
monetary aggregates; the main fact was that the rate
of increase of the monetary base went down from
28% in 1995 to 7% in 1996. In a dollarized economy
where three-quarters of the credit and of deposits in
the banking system are in foreign currency, however,
this fact is only of relative importance. Thus, the total
supply of credit to the private sector expanded in-
creasingly fast, rising from 43.6% in 1995 to 49.6%
in 1996, because of the larger amount of loans in
foreign currency.
The commercial banks markedly increased their
domestic loans in dollars with funds obtained abroad,
just when the monetary authority was trying to im-
pose credit restrictions through a sterilization policy.53
The evidence showing that the commercial banks
resorted to the international capital market in order
to satisfy the domestic demand for loans is conclu-
sive. It may be seen from table 3 (the column headed
“international liabilities as a percentage of  foreign
currency loans”) that the short-term external indebt-
edness of the commercial banks has grown rapidly
since the Mexican crisis.
The commercial banks have an incentive to carry
out this kind of operations because there is an appre-
ciable difference between the cost of these external
funds and the domestic interest rate on foreign
currency loans. Furthermore, domestic deposits in
dollars are subject to a high compulsory reserve
requirement (45%), but  external funds are exempt
from this. Thus the compulsory reserve policy of the
monetary authorities encourages the short-term exter-
nal indebtedness of the commercial banks.
Consequently, if the local bankers believe that it
is reasonable to increase their loans at a rapid rate,
and if the international markets provide them with the
funds to do this, this can easily set off a credit boom,
since the monetary authorities do not have the means
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TABLE 4
Peru: Fiscal indicators of operations of the
non-financial public sector (NFPS), 1991-1998
(As a percentage of GDP)
Saving on current account Capital Central
expenditure Primary Capital Primary govern-
Of central government result income result ment
Year Of Without Public Total of of of non-
Expen- NFPS interest invest- NFPS NFPSa NFPS NFPSb financial
Income diture Saving of NFPS ment expen-
diture
1991 9.5 9.6 -0.1 1.0 4.4 2.7 3.8 0.7 0.1 0.8 10.0
1992 11.4 11.6 -0.3 1.1 5.1 3.1 4.2 0.9 0.4 1.3 10.0
1993 11.3 11.1 0.2 1.9 5.5 3.4 4.4 1.1 0.4 1.5 10.7
1994 12.9 12.2 0.7 2.7 6.1 3.9 5.1 1.0 4.5 5.5 12.7
1995 13.6 13.2 0.4 2.1 5.3 4.0 5.0 0.3 1.6 1.9 13.8
1996 14.2 12.7 1.6 3.4 5.7 3.8 4.5 1.2 0.1 1.3 13.7
1997 14.1 11.8 2.2 4.4 6.1 3.8 4.5 1.6 0.1 1.7 13.4
1998 c 14.0 11.4 2.7 4.4 6.0 3.5 4.0 2.0 0.1 2.1 12.5
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (various issues).
a Without capital income.
b With capital income.
c Up to third quarter.
52 See Ugarteche, 1996 and 1997.
53 I.e.,  by selling short-term  securities to the banks and other
financial institutions in order to sterilize or counteract the money
issue resulting from the purchase of dollars.
to moderate this excessive expansion in bank credit.54
This explains why the severe fiscal adjustment was
accompanied in 1995-1996 with a substantial increase
in credit, thus cooling down the economy without doing
much to correct the trade deficit.55
The opposite phenomenon –a contraction which
is not desired by the monetary authorities– is also
possible, however. If the international markets sud-
denly cut off the funds with which they have been
supplying the domestic banking system, this could
give rise to a sharp contraction which would repre-
sent an enormous recessionary impulse while, at the
same  time, improving  the trade balance through a
reduction in imports.56 This is what happened in
the third quarter of 1998 as a result of the Russian
balance of payments crisis.
Since the outbreak of the Asian crisis in mid-
1997, the overall inflow of capital into the Peruvian
economy has gone down markedly. However, the
foreign-currency bank credit market has continued to
work smoothly thanks to the continual increase in the
funds obtained by the banks abroad.
In June 1998, the total short-term external debt
came to US$ 7323 million: equivalent to 70% of the
foreign exchange reserves of the monetary authority
or 110% if the compulsory reserves in respect of do-
mestic foreign currency deposits are excluded. About
half of this short-term external debt corresponded to
the commercial banking system, while the rest basi-
cally comprised the short-term debt of large non-fi-
nancial enterprises, which may nevertheless be
guaranteed in one way or another by the local banks.
In September, however, the Peruvian economy
was severely shaken by a heavy outflow of capital
due to the cancellation or non-renewal of the short-
term credit lines that the local commercial banks had
been obtaining abroad. This kind of stampede by the
external creditors of local banks, which occurred for
the first time during the 1990s, took place during the
financial panic caused by the Russian balance of pay-
ments crisis.
This abrupt reversal in the short-term capital
flows intermediated by the local commercial banks
caused a heavy speculative attack on the national cur-
rency. As  on  previous occasions  when there were
strong upward pressures in the exchange market, this
time also  the national-currency price of  the dollar
shot up, together with the inter-bank local currency
interest rate. The strange thing is that on this occasion
there was also an appreciable rise in the inter-bank
foreign-currency rate.
The Central Bank reacted to this upward pres-
sure on the exchange rate by taking measures which
had no precedent in recent years. Its first reaction was
to intervene in the foreign exchange market through
the sale of dollars, which it had not done since the
auto-coup in April 1992. Its second reaction was to
grant “liquidity credits” (short-term loans) in foreign
currency to the commercial banks so that the latter
could pay  their short-term  debts with the exterior,
thus acting in practice as lender of last resort. It also
reduced the average compulsory reserve rate on the
dollar deposits of the commercial banks three times
in succession, likewise so that the banks could pay
their short-term debts.
Finally, the Central Bank, the Superintendency
of Banks and Insurance Companies and the govern-
ment itself took two more much less orthodox meas-
ures to check the rise in the exchange rate. On the
one hand, they ordered the conversion of the public
sector’s foreign currency bank deposits into local cur-
rency: a kind of forced de-dollarization of the public
sector. These deposits represented about a quarter of
total deposits. On the other hand, the “overbuying” of
dollars by the banks and other financial institutions
was restricted to an amount equivalent to their effec-
tive net worth.
The September 1998 panic seems to have ush-
ered in a new period of scarcity of domestic credit in
foreign currency. According to the President of the
Bankers’ Association, the lower availability and higher
cost of  external  credit lines  will  affect mortgages,
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54 Compulsory reserve requirements could be applied to the funds
that the commercial banks obtain abroad, similar to the require-
ments in respect of domestic deposits in dollars, which would
make it possible to cut down the supply of foreign-currency
credit and make it more expensive. It could reasonably be argued
that such a restrictive credit policy would raise the interest rates
on loans in both soles and dollars, as well as the exchange rate
(see Dancourt and Mendoza, 1996). Until a short while ago, the
Central Bank was reluctant to impose compulsory reserve re-
quirements of this nature, claiming that they would interfere with
the free movement of capital and affect investors’ confidence. In
July 1998, however, the Superintendency of Banks and Insur-
ance Companies introduced minimum liquidity requirements
which carry out a function similar to these reserve requirements.
55 As a percentage of exports, the trade deficit went down from
39% in 1995 to 34% in 1996, while the real exchange rate re-
mained constant.
56 An important example of this direct link between credit and
imports is expenditure on durable goods such as automobiles and
electrical household appliances which are not produced in the
country.
loans for the  acquisition  of motor  vehicles, credit
cards and consumer credits (Gestión, 1998). And
everything seems to indicate that this severe restriction
of foreign currency credit could have a heavy negative
impact on sales of consumer durables, imports, the con-
struction industry and the prices of houses and land,
as well as threatening the stability of the local bank-
ing system. If anything is clear at all, it is that the
constant expansion of credit was the elixir that kept
the Peruvian economy going in recent years.
VII
By way of conclusion
In Peru, the neoliberal strategy consists of returning
to the development model based on primary com-
modity exports. This venture, which seeks to reinvent
the 1950s in the late 1990s, is naturally faced with
various obstacles.
The first  obstacle is of what we might call a
socio-political nature. Even if it is accepted that the
structural reforms made by Fujimori can successfully
restore the primary export model that prevailed dur-
ing the period from 1950 to 1960, it is necessary to
take account of the conflict that the high degree of
urbanization has introduced between the present so-
cial structure and the primary-export strategy.
Seminario (1995) stressed this contradiction,
noting that the starting point for this last liberal at-
tempt is a novel feature of this economic experiment:
i.e., the fact that Peru is now an essentially urban
economy. In the past, export economies were con-
structed on the basis of a mainly rural population, a
great abundance of natural resources compared with
the population, and a scanty level of industrial devel-
opment. According to the population censuses, how-
ever, the share of the urban population in the
population as a whole has risen from 35% in 1940 to
70% in 1993.
It is hard for an economy based on the export of
minerals to generate sufficient jobs in an urbanized
society, as the Peruvian experience shows. This
means that unemployment, whether disguised or not,
will be one of the crucial economic and social prob-
lems. Consequently, there will be political pressure to
develop economic activities to solve this problem. As
Schydlowsky (1995) has argued, this was one of the
factors that led to industrialization and protectionism.
In order to obtain a more diversified production
apparatus, it would be necessary to strengthen the
situation of domestic industry exposed to international
competition and to promote non-traditional exports
(including tourism). This involves reversing the trade
openness process to some extent and also correcting
the exchange-rate over-valuation. It also probably
means that the Peruvian economy should be firmly
integrated into the Andean Community in order to
thus obtain preferential access to a large market.
The exchange-rate appreciation already mentioned
would appear to represent an incoherent element, be-
cause the neoliberal reforms advocate a strategy of pro-
export growth. However, a low real exchange rate is
only incompatible with the development of industrial
exports or, perhaps, of Chilean-style agroindustrial
exports, or large-scale tourism. It is not necessarily
incompatible with the commodity exports which
have marked the whole of Peru’s economic history. It
all depends on the quality of the existing natural re-
sources and the available technology.
In reality, the problem could be posed in exactly
opposite terms. If we rule out major changes in the
level of economic activity or the propensity to im-
port, the only means of securing the medium-term
sustainability of this real exchange rate, which is as-
sociated with a trade deficit equal to over 30% of the
values exported in the last three years, is a big expan-
sion in these traditional exports. The question, then,
is first to determine if sufficient investment projects
have been put into effect in this traditional export
area (especially in the mining sector) and second, if
those projects will come on stream in a timely man-
ner: that is to say, before there is a decline in the
inflow of external capital, which finances the trade
deficit and the net payments in respect of the public
external debt and which supports this overvalued real
exchange rate.
This is obviously a fragile or vulnerable situ-
ation. Adverse external shocks which reduce the in-
flow of foreign capital or   lead to a   drop in
commodity prices and put back the maturity of the
NEOLIBERAL REFORMS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN PERU  OSCAR DANCOURT
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 970
investment projects underway could give rise to a
balance of payments crisis if macroeconomic policy
does not respond appropriately. (An essential compo-
nent in the crisis which occurred in 1975 under the
Velasco Alvarado military government was the delay
in the entry into operation of two big mining and
petroleum projects).
Since mid-1997, as on so many other occasions in
its history, the Peruvian economy has been suffering the
impact of an appreciable adverse external shock which
simultaneously affects both the current account and the
capital account of the balance of payments.  Export
commodity prices have gone down markedly since the
onset of the Asian crisis in mid-1997, causing a sharp
drop in the terms of trade, even though the dollar price
index of imports has also gone down.
At the same time, the overall inflow of capital
has gone down markedly since 1997. This paralyza-
tion of the inflow of external capital has extended not
only to long-term capital (direct investment con-
nected with privatization operations or mega-projects
in the mining sector, which were to significantly ex-
pand the production capacity of the export sector) but
also to short-term capital inflows (external indebted-
ness of the commercial banks) since mid-1998.
What are the most suitable macroeconomic poli-
cies for dealing with an unfavourable international
economic situation? This question brings us to the
other important obstacle facing the neoliberal strat-
egy, which we might call the macroeconomic obsta-
cle. The central hypothesis of this article is that the
Peruvian economy of the 1990s lacks an operative
form of macroeconomic regulation which could act
without giving rise to serious disturbances in the
level of economic activity.
In particular, it has become clear that the mone-
tary authorities do not possess the basic instruments
that have normally been used for coping relatively
successfully with the adverse external shocks to
which a small open economy is inevitably exposed.
Monetary policy has lost its effectiveness as a result
of two structural reforms which have been made in
the financial field: the dollarization of the banking
system and the opening up of the capital account.
Overcoming the first obstacle amounts to chang-
ing the primary export model, perhaps so much as to
make it unrecognizable. Overcoming the second ob-
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